LA PROVA SCHIACCIANTE CHE IL COVID 19 SERVIVA AD INSTAURARE IL NUOVO ORDINE MONDIALE CON L'APPOGGIO DEI PIU' IMPORTANTI ATTORI SULLA SCENA POLITICA MONDIALE. QUESTO DOCUMENTO E' CLASSIFICATO "TOP SECRET" E PROVA CHE IL CORONAVIRUS E' UN'ARMA PER IL TERRORISMO BIOLOGICO. IL LOSCO PIANO VEDE IL COINVOLGIMENTO DI USA, CINA, AUSTRALIA, CROAZIA, UCRAINA, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, SIRIA, FRANCIA, IRAN, GIAPPONE, NORD COREA, AUSTRIA, GERMANIA, ITALIA, BELGIO, FINLANDIA, PAESI BASSI, REPUBBLICA CECA, CIPRO. IL SECONDO DOCUMENTO CHE E' UN TELEGRAMMA DEL 29 GIUGNO 2009 RECA LA FIRMA DEL SEGRETARIO DI STATO HILLARY CLINTON.
Wikileaks Italian
#PlusD #BioWarfare Gli #USA ritengono che i partecipanti trarrebbero beneficio nell'assistere la #Cina nella creazione di un laboratorio di livello di biosicurezza 4 #BSL4 presso il #Wuhan Institute of Virology.....#SECRET 2009
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AUSTRALIA GROUP: PROMOTING PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY INFO EXCHANGE AND ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS MEETINGS
Date:
2009 June 29, 19:16 (Monday)
Canonical ID:
09STATE67207_a
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SECRET
Current Classification:
SECRET
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11951
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TEXT ONLINE
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CBW - Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons | ETTC - Trade and Technology Controls | PARM - Political Affairs--Arms Controls and Disarmament | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations
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Type:
TE - Telegram (cable)
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B. 08 PARIS 735 C. 08 STATE 16112 D. 07 STATE 58355 E. 06 STATE 70409 Classified By: Robert Mikulak, Dir., ISN/CB Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action request. All addressees please see paragraphs 3 and 4. (For information on previous action requests regarding this subject, please see reftels). 2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In preparation for the upcoming 2009 Australia Group (AG) plenary session in Paris, September 21-25, the U.S. would like to encourage other AG members to make presentations during the plenary's Information Exchange and Enforcement Experts sessions. We believe briefings on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs, trade in AG-controlled goods, terrorist attempts to acquire CBW, and case studies of export control enforcement actions will help energize AG participant dialogue on CBW proliferation issues. END SUMMARY. 3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: The Department requests that all addressee Embassies use the talking points in paragraph 5 to urge the appropriate host government officials to actively participate in the AG plenary Information Exchange and Enforcement Experts meetings. The Department also requests that individual addressee Embassies use the country-specific talking points in paragraphs 6-14 in addition to those provided in paragraph 5. Embassy Canberra should indicate that the points provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 should not/not be circulated as part of an official AG document. END ACTION REQUEST. 4. (U) Embassies should report host government views and comments by cable to ISN/CB by July 13, 2009, if possible. Please begin all responses with AUSTRALIA GROUP and slug for ISN. 5. (C) Begin Talking points for all Embassies: (CONFIDENTIAL//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We are looking forward to the Plenary meeting of the Australia Group (AG) in Paris, September 21-25. The Plenary presents AG participants with an opportunity to exchange information on issues related to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation that would benefit AG participants' implementation of export controls on CBW-related goods and technology. -- In this regard, we welcome the full and active participation of your country's delegation in the AG Plenary's Information Exchange and Enforcement Experts meetings. -- In the Information Exchange, we believe it is important to focus on emerging chemical and biological technologies, trends in the trade of CBW-related goods and threats (including threats from a regional perspective). We encourage participants to circulate any papers for the Information Exchange at least one week in advance of the Plenary so that AG participants can prepare for discussions at the exchange. -- The United States believes there is general interest among AG participants for any information you can share related to Russia in light of its continued interest in AG membership. This request is being made to all AG participants. We believe the following information would be particularly helpful to reaching consensus: - Your assessment of the effectiveness of Russia's export controls, particularly on CBW-related technology. - Any information you can share on the current state of Russia's CBW-related programs. -- For the Enforcement Experts Meeting, we encourage participants to include hands-on enforcement/customs officials in their delegations and to continue offering case studies of recent or past enforcement actions. -- The U.S.'s own participation in the Information Exchange STATE 00067207 002 OF 004 and Enforcement Experts meetings will be guided by these principles. End talking points. 6. (S) Begin talking points for Australia: (SECRET//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- The U.S. believes AG members would be interested in any information you can share related to China and North Korea, specifically information related to: - China's Institutes of Biological Products, to include overhead imagery analysis, if possible. - Your perceptions of the CBW proliferation activities by Chinese entities. - Your perceptions of Chinese government efforts to enforce its export control rules. - The current status of North Korea's CBW program. - Your perceptions of North Korea's CBW proliferation activities. - North Korean imports of AG-controlled chemicals or equipment for its chemical weapons program. -- In addition, we believe Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for Australia. 7. (S) Begin talking points for Austria: (SECRET//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We appreciated the views that you provided bilaterally prior to the 2008 Australia Group plenary and we would encourage you to give a presentation on either Iran or Russia at the 2009 plenary. -- Information Exchange or Enforcement Experts meeting participants will likely be interested in any information you can share related to Iran, specifically information related to: - Iranian procurement of technology, equipment, and expertise through front companies, government organizations, and other companies that could support a biological weapons program. - The types of biological products or ties that Iran has sought from Western Europe for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and other industries. -- The U.S. believe Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for Austria 8. (S) Begin talking points for Cyprus: (CONFIDENTIAL//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We appreciated the presentation you gave on your export control system during last year's Enforcement Experts meeting. -- The U.S. believes other Enforcement Experts meeting participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports and transshipment over the last year. End talking points for Cyprus. 9. (S) Begin talking points for France: (SECRET//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We appreciated the case study on transfers of AG-controlled equipment from China and Pakistan and vaccine collaboration between Russia and Syria. -- The U.S. believes participants would benefit from hearing about your experiences assisting China in setting up a Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4) laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology from the export control and intangible technology transfer perspectives. We are particularly interested to STATE 00067207 003 OF 004 know how China plans to vet incoming foreign researchers from countries of biological weapons proliferation concern. -- Information Exchange participants could benefit from a presentation on how you vet visa applicants to prevent intangible technology transfer to countries of chemical and biological weapons proliferation concerns. -- The U.S. also believes Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for France. 10. (S) Begin talking points for Germany: -- Information Exchange participants could benefit from a presentation on how you vet visa applicants to prevent intangible technology transfer to countries of chemical and biological weapons proliferation concern. -- The U.S. also believes Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. 11. (S) Begin talking points for Japan: (SECRET//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- The U.S. believes Information Exchange participants would be interested in any information you can share related to China or North Korea, specifically information related to: - CBW threats perceived by China. - Your perceptions of the CBW proliferation activities of Chinese entities. - The current state of North Korea's CBW program. - Your perceptions of North Korea's CBW proliferation activities. - North Korean imports of AG-controlled chemicals and equipment for its chemical weapons program. -- The U.S. also believes Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for Japan. 12. (S) Begin talking points for the Netherlands: (CONFIDENTIAL//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We appreciated the presentation you gave on the limitations to indigenous chemical weapons precursor production in Iran. -- Information Exchange participants would likely benefit from a similar analysis on the limitations of indigenous chemical weapons precursor production in Syria. -- The U.S. believes Information Exchange participants would benefit from bearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for the Netherlands. 13. (S) Begin talking points for Norway: (CONFIDENTIAL//AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- We appreciated the presentation you gave on using generating aerosols using commercially available sprayers. We would be interested to know whether you have studied the issue further and plan to give a follow-on presentation. -- The U.S. believes Information Exchange participants would benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for Norway. 14. (S) Begin talking points for the ROK: (SECRET//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- The U.S. believes Information Exchange participants would be interested in any information you can share related to STATE 00067207 004 OF 004 China, North Korea and Iran, specifically information related to: - CBW threats perceived by China. - Your perceptions of the CBW proliferation activities of Chinese entities. - The current state of North Korea's CBW program. - Your perceptions of North Korea's CBW proliferation activities. - North Korean imports of AG-controlled chemicals and equipment for its chemical weapons program. - Iranian procurement of technology equipment and expertise through front companies, governmental organizations, and other companies that could support a biological weapons program. - The types of biological products or ties that Iran has sought from East Asia for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and other industries. -- The U.S. also believes Information Exchange participants could benefit from hearing about your experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. -- One approach would be to follow the thorough presentation you gave on your export control system during the 2008 Enforcement Experts meeting with an real-life export license case study. End talking points for the ROK. 15. (S) Begin talking points for Sweden: (CONFIDENTIAL//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) -- The U.S. appreciated the presentation that you gave on the electrochemical alkylization of elemental phosphorus. It is important for AG members to be aware of new chemical production methods that might allow proliferators to circumvent Australia Group rules. -- The U.S. believes Information Exchange participants would benefit from hearing about you experiences dealing with AG-controlled exports over the last year. End talking points for Sweden. 16. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Please contact Andrew Souza in ISN/CB at 202-647-4838 or via classified e-mail at souzaam@state.gov for additional information or clarifications. CLINTON
References to this document in other cablesReferences in this document to other cables09WARSAW70109TOKYO159809PRAGUE41109BRUSSELS95709ROME86809CANBERRA60109BERLIN79709HELSINKI28109ZAGREB454 08VIENNA268
If the reference is ambiguous all possibilities are listed.
E questa è la prova del finanziamento del laboratorio di biosicurezza 4 (o meglio bioterrorismo) di Wuhan da parte dell'Unione Europea
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